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Despite an emerging consensus that societal energy consumption and related emissions are not only
inﬂuenced by technical efﬁciency but also by lifestyles and socio-cultural factors, few attempts
have been made to operationalise these insights in models of energy demand. This paper addresses
that gap by presenting a scenario exercise using an integrated suite of sectoral and whole systems
models to explore potential energy pathways in the UK transport sector. Techno-economic driven
scenarios are contrasted with one in which social change is strongly inﬂuenced by concerns about
energy use, the environment and well-being. The ‘what if’ Lifestyle scenario reveals a future in which
distance travelled by car is reduced by 74% by 2050 and ﬁnal energy demand from transport is halved
compared to the reference case. Despite the more rapid uptake of electric vehicles and the larger share
of electricity in ﬁnal energy demand, it shows a future where electricity decarbonisation could be
delayed. The paper illustrates the key trade-off between the more aggressive pursuit of purely
technological ﬁxes and demand reduction in the transport sector and concludes there are strong
arguments for pursuing both demand and supply side solutions in the pursuit of emissions reduction
and energy security.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Despite a widely agreed consensus that societal energy
consumption and related emissions are not only inﬂuenced by
technical efﬁciency but also by lifestyles and socio-cultural factors
(e.g. household size and composition, expenditure patterns, social
norms, habits and the ageing population), there is a methodolo-
gical gap between the perceived importance of these factors for
energy demand and quantitative modelling frameworks or even
scenario analysis. Indeed, there is much less consensus as to the
character and extent of these inﬂuences, particularly when
broadened out from societal changes to include individual
psycho-social factors such as well-being, social norms and values.
In particular, very few attempts have been made to operationalise
these insights into models of future energy demand.
This paper addresses this gap in research and practice by
presenting a quantitative scenario exercise using an integrated suite
of sectoral and whole systems models to explore potential energy
pathways in the UK transport sector. Presenting results in part from
the UK Energy Research Centre’s Energy 2050 project (Skea andhristian.brand@ouce.ox.ac.uk
.eyre@ouce.ox.ac.uk
Y license.Ekins, 2009), techno-economic driven scenarios are contrasted with
one in which social change is strongly inﬂuenced by concerns about
energy use, the environment and well-being so that transport
energy service demand is at a signiﬁcantly lower level by 2050 than
in the ‘business as usual’ assumptions of other pathways.
Empirical evidence of the potential for travel patterns to
change incrementally in response to policy and normative shifts
was combined with the development of a plausible ‘what if’
qualitative storyline about attitudinal, cultural and behavioural
change to 2050. The associated transport energy service demands
were modelled using MARKAL elastic demand (MED) to assess
the implications on fuel demand, emissions and the wider
energy sector in the UK. This involved the novel intermediate
step of soft-linking MED with a newly developed strategic
transport, energy, emissions and environmental impacts model—
the UK transport carbon model (UKTCM) (see Brand et al., this
issue). UKTCM is a highly disaggregated, bottom-up model of
transport energy use in the UK. It allows us to model the
energy service demands and vehicle choice of different assump-
tions about transport service demand, modal choice and trip
patterns.
This paper demonstrates how sectoral and energy system
models can be soft-linked to explore future scenarios in which the
potential contribution of demand-side behaviour change is
explored alongside technological change to meet a stringent 80%
emissions reduction target in the UK.
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At the global level, transport currently accounts for more than
half the oil used and nearly 25% of energy related carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions (IEA, 2008). From a 2005 baseline, transport
energy use and related CO2 emissions are expected to increase
by more than 50% by 2030 and more than double by 2050 with
the fastest growth from light-duty vehicles (i.e. passenger cars,
small vans, sport utility and vehicles), air travel and road freight
(IEA, 2008).
Transport is invariably deemed to be the most difﬁcult and
expensive sector in which to reduce energy demand and green-
house gas emissions (Enkvist et al., 2007; HM Treasury, 2006;
IPCC, 2007). The analysis on which such conclusions are based
tends to rely on forecasting and modelling frameworks which
accentuate technical solutions and economically optimal and
rational behaviour of individual consumers and markets, often
based on historic consumer preferences. The conventional trans-
port policy response to this issue reﬂects this dominant techno-
economic analytical paradigm and focuses on supply-side vehicle
technology efﬁciency gains and fuel switching as the central
mitigation pathway for the sector. Typically, the diffusion of
advanced vehicle technologies is perceived as the central means
to decarbonise transport. Since many of these technologies are not
yet commercially mature, or require major infrastructure invest-
ment, this focus has reinforced the notion that the transport
sector can only make a limited contribution to total CO2 emissions
reduction, particularly in the short term (HM Treasury, 2006;
Koehler, 2009). In the UK for example, electriﬁcation of the
passenger vehicle ﬂeet is a key strategy and viewed as necessary
to achieve the government’s stated 2050 target to cut CO2
equivalent of Kyoto GHG emissions by 80% from 1990 levels
(Ekins et al., 2009; CCC, 2009). The UK policy focus on vehicle
technology reﬂects other global transport modelling exercises
that depend upon between 40% and 90% market penetrations of
technologies such as plug-in hybrids and full battery electric
vehicles between 2030 and 2050 (IEA, 2008; McKinsey and
Company, 2009; WBCSD, 2004; WEC, 2007).
Although scenario exercises such as these are used to explore
the potential CO2 emissions reduction from rapid uptake of
vehicle technologies, the central danger is that the full potential
and necessary contribution of human behaviour, lifestyle change
and the important role of individual attitudes and perceptions are
often overlooked by policy makers. Other than changes in
preference required to facilitate the uptake of low carbon vehicles,
many of these scenario exercises treat other societal develop-
ments of signiﬁcance to transport as external to policy. In
addition, where societal developments are included, individual
behaviour change in invariably treated in abstract terms as part of
broader societal changes (Weber and Perrels, 2000).
An alternative would be to conduct scenario planning
exercises which underline the role that policy can play in working
with attitudes, opportunities and impacts to exert positive
inﬂuence on the type of society that is developing and the nature
of the transport system that thus co-evolves with it (Marsden
et al., 2010). In particular, such approaches pay attention to the
interaction between society and technology (Elzen et al., 2002).
The lifestyle approach is usually juxtaposed from one with a
purely technological focus as it tries to provide a wider picture of
the consumer (and required production processes to satisfy his
needs and wants) by depicting him or her in his socio-economic
context (Baiocchi et al., 2006). Individual attitudes and values are
seen as inﬂuential in shaping society’s engagement with techno-
logical opportunities in the face of environmental impacts that
will likely force a direction of response from policy makers and
society.To support this approach, there is a growing evidence base, or
even just a renewed appreciation of existing evidence, of the
potential for behaviour to alter in ways which mean that
reductions in the demand for travel activity and associated
energy are both plausible and cost effective (Sloman et al.,
2010; Cairns et al., 2008; Goodwin, 2008. Also see Gross et al.
(2009) for a comprehensive overview of the literature). These
behaviour changes encompass a whole variety of different types
of choice related to travel demand which include much more than
simply ‘retroﬁtting’ more efﬁcient transport modes on to current
journey patterns. In other words, a reduction in energy service
demand from transport will be achieved through a myriad of
individual and societal level shifts in preference for the amount of
time travelling, the choice of destinations and where to live,
attitudes towards health and the environment and the local
community, different models of car ownership, driving behaviour
as well as more ‘standard’ decisions about mode and car choice.
The ‘Lifestyle’ storyline of the Energy 2050 project looks at all of
these travel behavioural choices and speculates about the nature
and extent of plausible shifts before using an integrated modelling
framework to examine the implications for the UK energy system
and carbon reduction targets.3. Methodology
The UKERC Energy 2050 project aimed to show how the UK
can move towards a resilient and low carbon energy system over
the period to 2050 (Skea and Ekins, 2009). The project focuses on
two primary goals of UK energy policy—achieving deep cuts in
CO2 emissions by 2050, taking the current UK 80% reduction goal
as a starting point, and developing a ‘resilient’ energy system that
ensures consumers’ energy service needs are met reliably. In
addition, other policy goals are taken into account, namely
managing environmental impacts other than those related to
climate change and ensuring that everyone has access to
affordable energy services.
The core analysis used a combination of sectoral and ‘whole
systems’ models of the UK energy system to investigate key
uncertainties in low and carbon resilient energy through a
systematic comparison of scenarios. The system level models
captured interrelationships and choices across the energy system
and consisted of MARKAL (MARKet Allocation), a widely applied
bottom-up, dynamic, linear programming optimisation model
(Loulou et al., 2004), and an elastic demand version (MARKAL
elastic demand (MED)). MED is a technology-rich, multi-time
period optimisation model and portrays the entire energy system
from imports and domestic production of fuel sources through to
fuel processing and supply, explicit representation of infrastruc-
tures, conversion of fuels to secondary energy carriers (including
electricity, heat and hydrogen), end use technologies and energy
service demands of the entire economy. The model accounts for
the response of energy service demands (ESDs) to prices which, in
this exercise, could themselves increase as a result of carbon
constraints (Anandarajah et al., 2008).
In the ‘Lifestyles’ sub-project of Energy 2050, two out of the
four core scenarios developed in Energy 2050 were used as a
starting point to be contrasted with two Lifestyle ‘variants’ of
these core scenarios (hereafter referred to as the ‘Lifestyle
variants’). Before Lifestyle variants could be run in MED, an
alternative set of direct inputs in the form of energy service
demands, vehicle load factors, downsizing of the car ﬂeet, low
carbon technology take-up and changes in on-road fuel efﬁcien-
cies needed to be generated. This was undertaken for both the
residential and the transport sectors but this paper concentrates
on the development of the transport inputs only (see Anable et al.
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modelling of mobility energy demands for these variants
involved:1. Framing and development of a new ‘Lifestyle’ storyline and
translating this, using spreadsheet modelling, into projections
of travel patterns as an alternative to ofﬁcial UK government
projections used in the core Energy 2050 scenarios.2. Detailed sectoral modelling using the newly developed UK
transport carbon model (UKTCM) in order to simulate the
impacts of lifestyle changes on vehicle ownership, vehicle
technology choice and vehicle use.3. Soft-linking of UKTCM and MED by aggregating and converting
UKTCM outputs into MED inputs before MED was run.
Each of these stages will now be described in turn.2 In the UK, Car clubs are ‘pay as you go’ car hire schemes known as ‘Car
sharing’ in many other European Countries.3.1. The lifestyle storyline and spreadsheet modelling
Transport energy demand is a function of mode, technology
and fuel choice, total distance travelled, driving style and vehicle
occupancy. Distance travelled is itself a function of land use
patterns, destination, route choice and trip frequency. Most travel
behaviour modelling and forecasting is based on principles of
utility maximisation of discrete choices and on the principle that
travel-time budgets are ﬁxed (Metz, 2002). However, based on the
literature on socio-technical transitions, socio-psychological
models of behaviour change and evidence relating to actual travel
choices in response to policy interventions as well as, the Lifestyle
variant explored a world in which travel behaviour is strongly
inﬂuenced by concerns relating to health, quality of life, energy
use and environmental implications. As such, non-price driven
behaviour, which has already been found to play a signiﬁcant role
in transport choices (Anable, 2005; Steg, 2004; Turrentine and
Kurani, 2007) was deemed to be a dominant driver of energy
service demand from transport. It should be noted that this paper
does not review the literature pertaining to behaviour change
theory and the detailed combination of ingredients (motivational
and external) required for travel patterns to shift dramatically,
nor does it review the policy evidence in detail. We refer readers
to Anable et al. (2010) for the detail behind the Lifestyle storyline.
Making assumptions in this way, albeit based on uncertain
evidence, is akin to the treatment of the technical potential of
various solutions relating to vehicle technologies and fuels which,
as discussed, normally comprise the bulk of the future develop-
ments in transport energy scenario modelling exercises, despite
also being highly uncertain. In judging what rate and scale of
change seems plausible we have given most weight to the existing
variation in lifestyle observed in societies like our own, i.e.
technologically advanced, liberal democracies. Subject to some
obvious constraints imposed by age, wealth and location, for
example, it seems reasonable to suppose that if a signiﬁcant
fraction of the population (say 5–10%) somewhere in the OECD
already behave in a particular way, then it is plausible for this to
become a majority behaviour in the UK within the timeframe to
2050. This implies neither incremental nor step changes in
behaviour. There are increasing suggestions that incremental
changes in efﬁciency and behaviour will not be effective enough
to deliver sustainable energy systems on their own in the absence
of restrictions in consumption (Darby, 2007; Crompton, 2008). In
addition to incremental change, there is considerable interest in
the possibility of a ‘cultural shift’ affecting people’s lifestyles
(Elzen et al., 2002; Evans and Jackson, 2007; Koehler, 2009;
Crompton, 2008). Consequently, this Lifestyle variant outlinesradical change leading to relatively fast transformations and new
demand trajectories.
In the Lifestyle variant, travellers are more aware of the whole
cost of travel and the energy and emissions implications of travel
choices and are sensitive to the rapid normative shifts which alter
the bounds of socially acceptable behaviour. Consequently, the
variant assumed the focus would shift away from mobility
towards accessibility. In other words, the quality of the journey
experience rather than the quantity and speed of travel would
become more important. Social norms elevate active modes and
low-carbon vehicles in status and demote large cars, single-
occupancy car travel, speeding and air travel.
Efﬁcient, low-energy and zero energy (non-motorised) trans-
port systems will replace current petrol and diesel car-based
systems. The increased uptake of slower, active modes reduces
average distances travelled as distance horizons change. Localism
means people work, shop and relax closer to home and long-
distance travel will move from fast modes (primarily air and the
car) to slow-speed modes covering shorter distances overall (local
rail and walking and cycling). The novelty of air travel wanes as
not only does it become socially unacceptable to ﬂy short
distances, airport capacity constraints mean it becomes less
convenient. Weekends abroad are replaced by more domestic
leisure travel but this is increasingly carried out by low-carbon
hired vehicles, rail and luxury coach and walking and cycling trips
closer to home. It also becomes socially unacceptable to drive
children to school. However, capacity constraints limit the pace of
change so that mode shift to buses and rail will be moderated.
New models of car ownership are embraced. This includes car
clubs2 and the tendency to own smaller vehicles for every day
family use and to hire vehicles for longer distance travel. These
are niche markets in which new technology is fostered. Lower car
ownership is correlated with lower car use.
The new modes, in turn, will result in a new spatial order
towards compact cities, mixed land uses and self contained cities
and regions. Some services return to rural areas, but it becomes
more common to carry out personal business by internet. Small-
scale technology facilitates relatively rapid behavioural change.
Information and Communication Technology (ICT: telematics, in-
car instrumentation, video conferencing, smartcards and e-
commerce) makes cost and energy use transparent to users and
changes everything from destination choice, car choice, driving
style and paying for travel, including in the freight sector. A more
radical change takes place through changes in work patterns and
business travel. The impacts of teleworking and video conferen-
cing are known to be complex, but potentially important (Gross
et al., 2009). Teleworking particularly affects the longer commute
trips and thus has a disproportionately large impact on average
trip lengths. Increased internet shopping and restrictions on
heavy goods vehicles, particularly in town centres, increases the
use of vans. There is some shift towards rail freight.
There is increasing acceptance of restrictive policies in the
context of more choice for local travel as the alternatives are
improved. These restrictions include the general phasing out of
petrol/diesel vehicles in town/city centres through low emission
zones, increased parking charges and strict speed enforcement.
Generally, however, the policy environment is one of ‘push and
pull’ as ﬁscal and regulatory sticks are combined with the carrot
of infrastructure investment (e.g. in car clubs, public transport,
cycle infrastructure and railway capacity).
Combined with the shifts towards active modes and different
models of car ownership, this amounts to signiﬁcant lifestyle
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ﬁrst analysed using a spreadsheet model which took as its starting
point the ﬁgures for individual travel patterns in 2007 based on
the UK National Travel Survey (DfT, 2008). Figures for each
journey purpose (commuting, travel in the course of work,
shopping, education, local leisure, distance leisure and other) in
terms of average number of trips, average distance (together
producing average journey length), mode share and average
occupancy were altered based on an evidence review relating to
the impact of transport policies and current variation in travel
patterns within and outside the UK (see Anable et al. (2010) for a
detailed overview of the calculations).Table 1
Summary of the four contrasting scenario runs using MED.
Core energy 2050 scenarios
REF Low carbon REF (LC
Key assumptions Provides a baseline from
which to assess the actions
and costs associated with
achieving policy goals.
Concrete policies and
measures in place in the UK
in 2007 continue into the
future but no additional
measures are introduced
REF+carbon constra
leading to an 80% re
in UK carbon emiss
2050 relative to 199
an intermediate mil
26% in 2020 and lin
interpolation in bet
Method UK Government
projections+MED
UK Government
projections+MED
GDP and population
growth
Historic long-term average
GDP growth rate for the UK
of 2.0% continues to 2050;
projections of population
growth were taken from UK
Government sources
Lifestyle
assumptions
Lifestyle choices continue to
develop along the same
trajectory as in the past—i.e.
there will be a greater take-
up of energy efﬁciency
measures, but people are
assumed to balance the
initial cost of efﬁciency
measures against on-going
energy costs (based on
observed income elasticities
of demand) with increasing
wealth at the projected
growth rate
Lifestyle choices are
inﬂuenced by conce
energy use, the env
and well-being. Not
non-price determin
behaviour recognise
as values, norms, fa
identity, trust and
knowledge, but also
consumptive eleme
behaviour such as p
time use, mobility,
networking, expecta
and policy acceptan
shifts will empower
consumers to chang
lifestyles and to loo
of the external cons
that make changes
more sustainable tr
patterns difﬁcult
Demand elasticities MED demand elasticities
remain unchanged over time
to reﬂect the fact that energy
consumer preferences (i.e.
the way they respond to
prices and available
technology) stay the same
The derived ‘lifestyl
demand projections
gradually lower elas
of demand as incom
population continue
In order to avoid do
counting the transp
residential energy)
elasticities in the Li
MED runs were set
(while agriculture, s
and industry deman
elasticities were un
Note: These 4 scenarios should not be confused with the two model runs produced
methodology (see Section 3.2).The underlying principle of the derived projections of ‘lifestyle’
travel patterns is that they should be internally consistent and
plausible. The method of how they were derived implies that they
do not present a forecast using an econometric transport demand
model, or a 4-stage transport demand network model. Speciﬁ-
cally, the lifestyle projections of travel demand are not the result
of changes in income or price elasticities of demand, GDP or
population growth. The derived ‘Lifestyle’ travel demand projec-
tions actually imply gradually lower income (and population)
elasticities of demand as incomes and population continue to
grow in all four scenarios considered in this paper (see Table 1).
Notably, in order to avoid double counting once these projectionsLifestyle variants of the core energy 2050 Scenarios
) Lifestyle REF (LS REF) Lifestyle low carbon (LS LC)
int
duction
ions by
0, with
estone of
ear
ween
Shifts in societal preferences,
activities and associated
policies generate alternative
energy service demands,
vehicle technology uptake
and on-road fuel efﬁciencies.
MED was run without a
carbon constraint akin to the
core REF scenario
LS REF+carbon constraint
leading to an 80%
reduction in UK carbon
emissions by 2050 relative
to 1990, with an
intermediate milestone of
26% in 2020 and linear
interpolation in between
UK Government
projections+spreadshee-
t+UKTCM+MED
UK Government
projections+spreadshee-
t+UKTCM+MED
strongly
rns about
ironment
only are
ants of
d, such
shion,
non-
nts of
atterns of
social
tions
ce. Policy
e
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traints
towards
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e’ travel
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ticities
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ort (and
demand
festyle
to zero
ervice
d
touched)
separately in UKTCM (TCM REF and TCM LS) as an intermediate stage in the
J. Anable et al. / Energy Policy 41 (2012) 125–138 129were eventually fed into MED, the transport demand elasticities
in the Lifestyle MED runs were set to zero.3 In the cases of the LC and LS LC scenarios, the carbon emissions constraint is
binding before any system costs are optimised, resulting in higher overall system
costs. The MED model provides marginal costs of reducing carbon emissions
further than the constraint, thus providing a shadow price of carbon (as an output,
not input).3.2. Modelling lifestyle using the UK transport carbon model
The UKTCM is a strategic transport-energy-environment
simulation model designed to model a wide range of policies
and policy ‘packages’ (or ‘bundles’) including demand manage-
ment policies, measures affecting vehicle ownership and use,
ﬁscal and pricing policies, eco-driving programmes, fuel obliga-
tions, speed enforcement and targeted technology investment
incentives. It provides annual projections of transport supply and
demand, and calculates the corresponding energy use, lifecycle
emissions and environmental impacts year-by-year up to 2050. It
simulates passenger and freight transport across all transport
modes, built around exogenous scenarios of socio-economic and
political developments. It integrates simulation and forecasting
models of elastic demand, vehicle ownership, technology choice
(using a discrete choice modelling framework), stock turnover,
energy use and emissions, lifecycle inventory and impacts, and
valuation of external costs. An introduction to the model has been
published in Brand et al. (this issue); further details can be
obtained from the Reference Guide (Brand, 2010a) and User Guide
(Brand, 2010b), published by the UK Energy Research Centre.
The set of ‘Lifestyle’ transport energy serviced demands
(distance travelled, mode split and vehicle occupancy) developed
above was entered into UKTCM as exogenous transport demands.
In addition, lower multiple car ownership was simulated by
lowering the car ownership saturation levels for households
owning 2 or more cars. It was further assumed that by 2020 no
‘large cars’ (above a certain engine size and gross vehicle weight)
are being sold. The changes in social norms, consumer prefer-
ences, improved performance and market presence of low carbon
road vehicles (essentially efﬁcient hybrid electric vehicles (HEV),
battery electric vehicles (BEV) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
(PHEV)) were modelled by assuming low carbon road vehicles
have gradually increasing consumer preferences, performance
and market availability up to the point where they are compar-
able (or even better) than their conventional counterparts of a
certain reference technology (e.g. medium size gasoline internal
combustion engine car of vintage 2015–2019). The scale and
timing of these changes have been modelled on the assumptions
behind the high- to extreme-range technology scenarios of the
recent scoping exercise commissioned by UK Government
Departments (BERR & DfT, 2008), and further informed by low
carbon transport scenario work such as reported in Hickman and
Banister (2007). Within the UKTCM discrete choice modelling
framework, equal preference implies equality in perceived market
potentials (availability of infrastructure), perceived risk (fuel type,
‘proven’ vs. ‘new’ technology) and performance (range, speed,
acceleration, etc.). No changes in investment and ﬁxed Operation
and Management (O&M) costs were assumed, as consumers of
tomorrow choose to buy greener vehicles not on the basis of
reduced purchase prices but on the basis of changed preferences
for and perceived risk of a low-carbon vehicle. Finally, the on-road
fuel efﬁciency programme and general adherence to speed limits
was modelled by assuming an alternative set of speed proﬁles for
motorways and dual carriageways, with direct effects on on-road
fuel consumption.
In the results sections below, the UKTCM Lifestyle outputs
(TCM LS) are contrasted to a reference case (TCM REF). These two
model runs represented an intermediate stage in the methodol-
ogy and are not to be confused with the MED scenarios outlined in
Table 1 which ultimately generated the system level energy
demands and progress towards UK carbon emissions targets.3.3. MARKAL elastic demand
UKTCM outputs (fuel consumption, vehicle ﬂeet evolution by
vehicle technology) were translated into MED inputs (technical
energy efﬁciency, technology deployment constraints and
bounds).
MED was then run to produce four contrasting scenarios—two
core Energy 2050 scenarios and two Lifestyle ‘variants’. In each
case, they were distinguished by whether they were uncon-
strained (REF) or constrained3 (LC) to guarantee the achievement
of an 80% fall in UK carbon emissions relative to 1990 levels by
2050. Thus, four scenarios resulted as follows: REF: unconstrained core Energy 2050 Reference Scenario.
 LC: constrained low carbon core Energy 2050 Scenario.
 LS REF: unconstrained Lifestyle variant.
 LS LC: constrained low carbon Lifestyle variant.The detailed assumptions embedded in the core scenarios are
available in Skea and Ekins (2009). Table 1 provides an overview
of the key elements of each.
The following 3 sections outline the results relating to the
impacts on: travel patterns and vehicle technology, energy use
and fuel demand in the transport sector and carbon emissions and
the wider energy system.4. Impact on travel patterns and vehicle technology
The impact on travel patterns was modelled using the
spreadsheet model and UKTCM as described above and the
results can be divided into the following key areas of energy
service demands from transport: Changing surface passenger travel patterns.
 Domestic air travel and surface freight transport.
 Driving style and on-road fuel efﬁciency.
 Vehicle ownership and technology choice.4.1. Changing surface passenger travel patterns
Based on the initial spreadsheet modelling exercise which
altered average number of trips, total distance, mode share and
vehicle occupancy for each journey purpose, this ﬁrst exercise
resulted in a 74% reduction in distance travelled by car by 2050 as
a driver and a passenger. The use of all other surface transport
modes increases, apart from a 12% fall in distance travelled by
Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV or trucks). The reduction in car travel
comes about as a result of signiﬁcant mode shifts, particularly to
bus travel towards the latter half of the period (184% increase in
vehicle kilometres) and cycling and walking. Mode shift is
combined with a fall in average trip lengths due to destination
shifting as a result of localisation and a fall in the total number of
trips per capita as some journeys are replaced with ‘virtual’
means.
Fig. 1 shows how people become progressively more ‘multi-
modal’ by the end of the period in the LS REF variant. In 2020, the
car is still used for the majority of distance travelled as a driver or
passenger (67%), but this drops to 28% by 2050. However, ‘other
Fig. 1. Surface passenger transport by distance and mode split in different years in the LS REF and LS LC variants.
J. Anable et al. / Energy Policy 41 (2012) 125–138130private’ (which includes taxis, hire cars and car club cars)
increases from 2.4% of distance in 2007, to 7.5% so that, combined
with being a car passenger, 36% of all distance is still undertaken
by car in 2050. At the same time, cycling goes from accounting for
less than 1% to almost 13% of distance travelled. This surpasses
levels seen today in countries regarded as demonstrating best
practice in this area. For example, in 2006 an average Dutch
person cycled 850 km/year, corresponding to around 8% of total
distance travelled (SWOV, 2006). We chose to push this further
over 40 years on the basis that the Dutch have achieved this level
so far without comprehensively restricting cars from urban
centres and increasing the cost of motoring, which our Lifestyle
variant assumes. If cycling and walking are added together, ‘active
modes’ account for 28% of travel in 2050. Implicit in the
assumptions made here is the fact that cars are increasingly
banned or priced out of city/town centres.4.2. Domestic air travel and surface freight transport
With regard to air travel, growth in domestic ﬂights are assumed
to slow and eventually saturate. This is primarily due to three
factors. Firstly, it becomes increasingly uncompetitive on the basis of
cost as oil price increases and carbon taxation bring an end to
budget airlines and cheap ﬂights. Secondly, domestic ﬂying also
becomes uncompetitive in terms of time as rail is improved. Thirdly,
ﬂying becomes increasingly unacceptable, particularly for short
distances, and thus returns to being a luxury activity. Average load
factors in the LS REF and LS LC variants are assumed to stay
unchanged compared to the REF and LC core scenarios. As a result,
any changes in air passenger-km translate directly into air vehicle-
km (domestic only). The resulting domestic air vehicle-km in the LS
REF and LS LC variants are 2% and 16% lower in 2020 and 2050,
respectively, than in the REF and LC core scenarios.
With regard to van trafﬁc, van ownership and use continues to
increase as it did in the decade prior to 2007, growing by 138% by
2050 over the 2005 levels. The move towards a service economy and
more teleshopping contribute to this trend. As van technology
improves and their cost of ownership and use declines, this furtherencourages their use. Town/city centres increasingly ban heavy
goods vehicles but allow electric vans and local trafﬁc regulations
will give priority to professional home delivery and coordinated
urban distribution with clean vehicles. As a result, the overall
distance travelled by vans increases by 5% by 2050 in the LS REF and
LS LC variants when compared to the REF and LC core cases.
With regard to heavy goods vehicles, we assume their use is
still set to grow (by 36% between 2005 and 2050) but as a result of
increased load factors, overall distance travelled by these vehicles
will fall by 3% (2020) and 12% (2050) in the LS REF and LS LC
variants when compared to the REF and LC core scenarios.
Changes in consumer demands (including through origin/ carbon
labelling and dematerialisation (the substitution of products with
services)) may lead to reductions in freight movements, but the
greatest savings will come from more efﬁcient logistics. The ‘lorry
intensity’ of the UK economy (the ratio of lorry-kms to GDP)
declined by almost 20% between 1990 and 2004, partly as a result
of companies using vehicle capacity more efﬁciently (McKinnon,
2007). There, nevertheless, remains considerable potential for
improving ‘vehicle ﬁll’. Companies can adopt a range of vehicle
utilisation measures which would lead to reduced lorry-km and
CO2 emissions. In some cases this will require changes to current
business practice utilising integrated logistic services pertaining
to several steps of production and distribution and based on
complex information systems. These changes will require policy
support for the development of technologies and standards for
automatic ﬂexible freight handling and tracing together with the
implementation of consolidation centres and the introduction of
CO2 related taxes for freight vehicles to effectively raise road
transport costs (Hickman and Banister, 2007). These changes will
together mean the growth in heavy freight will be substantially
reduced, particularly by road. Rail and waterborne freight play a
bigger role, mainly due to mode shift from roads.4.3. Driving style and on-road fuel efﬁciency
Eco-driving reduces fuel consumption through more efﬁcient
driving style, reducing speeds, proper engine maintenance,
Table 2
On-road fuel efﬁciency improvements from ecodriving in the LS REF and LS LC
variants.
Vehicle distance (km) affected
2008 2010 2015 2020 2030 2050
Cars (%) 4 8 18 46 62 62
Vans (%) 4 8 18 50 70 70
Trucks (%) 4 8 18 50 70 70
Fleet average fuel efﬁciency and emissions improvements per
km
Carsa (%) 0.3 0.6 1.4 3.7 4.9 4.9
Vansa (%) 0.3 0.6 1.4 4.0 5.6 5.6
Trucksa (%) 0.2 0.3 0.7 2.0 2.8 2.8
a Car and van drivers are assumed to be 8% more efﬁcient per km, and HGV
drivers 4% per km, due to eco-driving.
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loads (King, 2007; TNO, 2006). Policy measures can include
information campaigns and encouraging or requiring driver
training. Potential savings appear to be signiﬁcant and costs
low, with the biggest obstacles being securing driver participation
and ensuring that efﬁcient driving habits are sustained over time
(Gross et al., 2009). This suggests that if the potential beneﬁts of
more efﬁcient driving styles are to be secured, an ongoing
programme of training, and reinforcement through advertising
and other awareness raising mechanisms is likely to be needed.
In the Lifestyle variants, the high cost of motoring and the
social pressure to improve driving standards for both safety and
environmental reasons, mean that efﬁciency, quality and relia-
bility overtake speed as the priority for travel. Speeding becomes
socially unacceptable as it is seen as wasteful. Eco-driving is
reinforced with strict speed enforcement, high penalties and tax
incentives for in-car instrumentation such as speed limiters, fuel
economy meters and tyre pressure indicators.
Initial calculations were made in the spreadsheet model by
assuming how many drivers in any given year would be practicing
eco-driving and what proportion of their miles would be affected at
what level of efﬁciency improvement. In any given year, new
drivers will start to practice these techniques, and for others the
effectiveness will begin to ‘trail off’, although it is assumed that the
behaviour is reinforced by repeat training programmes and
campaigns so that it becomes more or less habitual. Even for those
who are practicing it, not every mile they drive will be affected. For
those miles affected, an 8% efﬁciency improvement is assumed.
This is at the lower end of the evidence base (Gross et al., 2009).
Business uptake of eco-driving is expected to be quicker as it is
easier to integrate training programmes and instrumentation.
Eco-driving will also be practiced by van and truck drivers.
Penetration through van ﬂeet is expected to mirror that of car
business travel. Penetration through the truck ﬂeet is the same as
for vans. However, the savings per mile are lower (4%) as these
vehicles are already speed limited.
In each case (for cars, vans and trucks) the savings only apply
to petrol/diesel vehicles. The potential to save fuel and emissions
for alternative propulsion vehicles such as electric and plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles is lower, as the propulsion system is
already technically optimised, leaving less room for improvement
by the driver (Gross et al., 2009). These assumptions were then
combined to derive a time series of aggregate fuel consumption
for the conventional car, van and truck ﬂeets. This was then
transferred to UKTCM by scaling the vehicle emissions factors
used. For cars, for example, the vehicle distance (km) affected
reaches 60% by about 2025. Multiplying this by 8% saving
per km travelled gives 4.8% in fuel consumption and emissions
savings, or a scaling factor of 0.952 applied to ‘without eco-
driving’ fuel consumption and emissions. A summary of the
effects of on-road fuel efﬁciency improvements from eco-driving
is shown in Table 2.4 These two model runs represented an intermediate stage in the methodol-
ogy and are not to be confused with the ﬁnal MED-generated scenarios (the two
core scenarios (REF and LC) and two variants (LS REF and LS LC)).4.4. Vehicle ownership and technology choice
In the LS REF and LS LC variants, private, ﬂeet and commercial
buyers prefer advanced conventional and electric vehicles over
conventional internal combustion vehicles (ICV). The market
responds by increasing availability and performance of lower
carbon vehicles. This was ﬁrst modelled in UKTCM before being
translated into MED inputs and further modelling using MED.
Vehicle ownership and technology choice is modelled in much
more detail in UKTCM than in MED; hence it is appropriate to
present the intermediate results of vehicle technology choice by
comparing UKTCM Lifestyle outputs (TCM LS) reference caseoutputs (TCM REF).4 In the TCM LS model run, ultra efﬁcient ICV
and hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) are the main focus in the short
term (up to 2020). Battery electric vehicles (BEV) fulﬁl market
niche roles in the medium term (2015–2030), especially electric
buses, cars and vans in urban areas. Plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEV) dominate sales in the medium to long term (from
2025). This ‘Lifestyle’ purchasing behaviour is illustrated for cars
in Fig. 2, showing historic and projected new car sales (not total
ﬂeet) by propulsion type for the TCM LS model run. While in 2007
more than 99% of new cars are conventional ICV, the TCM LS
scenario suggests that by 2020 28% of new cars will be ultra-
efﬁcient HEV, 16% small BEV, and 8% PHEV. By 2050, nearly half
(46%) of new cars will be PHEV, 18% HEV and 9% small BEV. Fig. 2
also illustrates the limited role of high-blend bio-fuels (mainly
100% second generation biodiesel) in the TCM LS model run,
reﬂecting low consumer preference and limited market deploy-
ment due to sustainability and availability concerns.
Two further lifestyle changes were simulated for cars. First, car
buyers – whether private, ﬂeet or business – are assumed to choose
smaller cars instead of larger ones. This is simulated in UKTCM by
phasing out the sale of new large cars (engine size 42.0 l) by
2020—starting in 2010, with linear interpolation between 2010 and
2020. Secondly, the tendency towards less overall car use and the
increased membership of car clubs for use of a variety of types of
cars for longer distance journeys is modelled endogenously in
UKTCM by assuming signiﬁcantly lower levels of maximum car
ownership per household in urban and non-urban areas—about half
of the reference value (TCM REF) for households owning ‘at least 2
cars’ and ‘at least 3 cars’. The TCM REF levels are based on
assumptions contained in the car ownership module of the UK
government’s National Transport Model (for details see ITS Leeds,
2001; Whelan, 2007), which imply a continued growth due to
changes in income, household structure and license holding. By
lowering the maximum levels for second, third or more cars per
household we basically limit overall car ownership levels for
multiple household car ownership.
The changes in overall trafﬁc levels, modal shares and the
increased demand for lower carbon vehicles modelled in UKTCM
are further illustrated in Fig. 3, showing road vehicle trafﬁc (in
billion vehicle-km) in the UKTCM reference (TCM REF, on the left)
and UKTCM Lifestyle (TCM LS, on the right) model runs. In TCM LS,
total road vehicle-km stay about constant at current levels (while
they nearly double in TCM REF), and conventional ICV technology
Fig. 2. New car sales by year as modelled by the TCM LS model run. ICV—internal combustion vehicle, HEV—hybrid electric vehicle, PHEV—plug-in hybrid electric vehicle,
EV—electric vehicle, FCV—fuel cell vehicle, E85—85% bio-ethanol plus 15% petrol blend, biodiesel (2nd gen) and ICV—pure (100%) second generation biodiesel. The peak
and subsequent drop in new car sales in 2005–2007 is based on observed data.
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2007 less than 0.1% of car trafﬁc is by cars other than conventional
ICV, the TCM LS model run projects that by 2020 24% of car trafﬁc
will be ultra-efﬁcient HEV, 7% small BEV, and 2% PHEV. By 2030,
27% of car trafﬁc will be HEV, 22% PHEV and 13% small BEV. In the
long term (2050), nearly half (45%) of car trafﬁc will be PHEV, 20%
HEV and 9% small BEV. Cars running on bio-fuels do not account
for more than 2% of total car trafﬁc over the period considered.
As for other vehicle types, the increase in motorcycle trafﬁc is
mainly for electric motorcycles. Penetrating the mass market from
around 2012, 18% of truck vehicle-km will be HEV by 2020,
increasing to 28% by 2040. PHEV trucks penetrate the market later
and reach a plateau of about 22% roughly by 2035. BEV trucks
never really take off, with BEV vans penetrating niches (about 3%)
in the urban delivery market.
How does all this disaggregate modelling translate into MED
inputs? The outputs of two UKTCM model runs (TCM REF and
TCM LS) were aggregated (e.g. over car sizes), integrated with
assumptions on car downsizing (see above) and translated into
MED inputs for the Lifestyle variants (LS REF and LS LC) as energy
service demands (in billion vehicle-km), average speciﬁc energy
use ﬁgures (PJ/billion vehicle-km) for the MED vehicle types (NB:
there is only one car size in MED). The inputs were essentially
technology deployment bounds for minimum uptake and average
vehicle fuel efﬁciencies (in combination with on-road fuel
efﬁciency improvements). So as to avoid double counting, the
transport demand elasticities in the Lifestyle MED runs were set
to zero (while agriculture, service and industry demand elasti-
cities were untouched) (see Table 1). In addition, the general shift
in consumer preference was modelled in MED by assuming lower
‘hurdle rates’ (discount rate for capital expenditure) for energy-
efﬁcient and lower-carbon vehicles such as PHEV cars (12.5%
instead of 15%, from 2020) and BEV motorcycles (15% instead of
25%, from 2015) when compared to the core REF scenario.
The ﬁnal MED outputs show the signiﬁcant variance in the
trafﬁc levels, modal shares and technology mixes between thetwo core Energy 2050 scenarios and the two Lifestyle variants.
Fig. 4 shows the car vehicle types in each of these 4 MED runs in
2020 and 2050. In the Lifestyle reference variants (LS REF & LS LC),
by 2020 market shares (in terms of vehicle km, not energy use) for
HEV and BEV cars reach 21% and 9%, respectively, compared to
zero penetration in the core REF and LC scenarios. From 2020
gasoline PHEV cars become more popular in all but the core REF
scenario, reaching market shares in 2050 of around 50%. In total,
in the Lifestyle variants, HEV, BEV and PHEV cars have a 77–81%
market share in 2050 albeit of a signiﬁcantly smaller market
overall (car use is 74% less than in the REF case). While diesel
PHEV, hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles (FCV) and bio-methanol FCV
cars do not appear in any of the scenarios, the core carbon
constraint scenario (LC) sees a massive uptake of a high-level
blend of bio-ethanol and petrol (E85) cars (33% of total car trafﬁc
in 2050), while the Lifestyle carbon constrained variant (LS LC)
sees none. This suggests that at reduced demand levels in the
Lifestyle variant, the shift to electric cars (BEV, PHEV) combined
with a decarbonised electricity system is sufﬁciently cost-
effective to avoid deployment of more costly bio-fuel technology.
The MED results suggest that in the unconstrained Lifestyle
variant (LS REF) neither BEV nor PHEV road vehicles were taken
up earlier or at higher levels than the rates laid down by UKTCM
outputs. In contrast, HEV buses, trucks and vans were taken up at
much higher levels (100% in some cases) when compared to the
UKTCM outputs. This can be explained by lower annuitized cost
for HEV than for their ICV counterparts and the use of only lower
(no upper) limits for technology take-up as prescribed by the
UKTCM outputs.
In all four scenarios modelled in MED, nearly all of van and
HGV trafﬁc in 2020 will be by ultra-efﬁcient diesel/biodiesel HEV.
This essentially means a complete hybridisation of the existing
ICV road freight ﬂeet over the next 10 years. By 2050, HGV trafﬁc
is still dominated by diesel/biodiesel HEV in the REF and LS REF
runs, while in the carbon constrained runs (LC & LS LC) hydrogen
fuel cell powertrains now dominate the HGV market. For vans,
Fig. 3. UKTCM model run comparison for motorised road trafﬁc by vehicle type and propulsion technology (TCM REF modelling run on the left, TCM LS on the right).
ICV—internal combustion vehicle, HEV—hybrid electric vehicle, PHEV—plug-in hybrid electric vehicle and BEV—battery electric vehicle.
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gasoline PHEV in the carbon unconstrained runs (REF & LS REF).
However, in the low carbon Lifestyle variant (LS LC), the market is
more mixed as the carbon constraint results in higher take-up
rates for biodiesel PHEV. BEV vans only appear in the Lifestyle
variants as they penetrate niche markets in urban areas (7–8% of
total road freight).5. Impact on energy use and fuel demand in the transport
sector
The higher uptake of lower and zero carbon vehicles combined
with efﬁciency gains, downsizing of cars, mode shifts and
signiﬁcant alterations to work, shopping and leisure travel
patterns result in ﬁnal energy demand being halved from this
sector in the unconstrained Lifestyle variant (LS REF) by 2050
compared to the unconstrained reference case (REF) (Fig. 5). In the
unconstrained Lifestyle variant (LS REF), total fuel demand
reduces by 23% by 2020 and by 43% by 2050 compared to the2000 base. This contrasts to an increase of 15% in the reference
case (REF) in 2050. The demand for conventional fuels (petrol+-
diesel) decreases by 57% by the year 2050 in the unconstrained
Lifestyle variant (LS REF) and by 87% when constrained (LS LC).
However, in all scenarios, conventional fuel still dominates use in
2020, never falling below 89% of total demand.
By comparison, electricity demand grows steeply, particularly
in the second half of the period, accounting for 18% of total fuel
demand in the unconstrained Lifestyle variants by 2050 (Fig. 5).
This demand is 67% higher than in the unconstrained reference
case (REF) where HEVs and BEVs have zero market share,
even by 2050, although there is some increase in electricity use
later in the period from rail, some battery operated buses and
plug-in electric vans. In the constrained reference case (LC),
however, the uptake of gasoline PHEVs is very high, although BEV
uptake remains zero. Altogether, taking car (PHEV), vans (PHEV
and BEV) and bus (BEV), a third of road transport energy demand
is met by plug-in electric vehicle technology in 2050. Use of
electriﬁed rail also increases by over 200% over present use
by 2050.
Fig. 4. Car vehicle type by distance driven in different scenarios and years, MED results. REF—reference, LS REF—Lifestyle reference, LC—low carbon constrained,
LS LC—Lifestyle low carbon constrained, BEV—battery electric vehicle, HEV—hybrid electric vehicle, PHEV—plug-in hybrid electric vehicle and ICV—internal combustion
vehicle.
Fig. 5. Transport fuel demand (PJ) by transport fuel in each scenario in 2020 and 2050, MED results. REF—reference, LS REF—Lifestyle reference, LC—low carbon
constrained and LS LC—Lifestyle low carbon constrained.
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(LC & LS LC). This is a result of the availability of unconstrained
blending of second generation biodiesel and the assumption
within MED than bio-fuels have zero net carbon emissions (much
liked by a scenario modelling an 80% cap on emissions), while in
the reference cases (REF and LS REF) demands decrease in line
with petrol and diesel demands. A high-level blend of bio-ethanol
and petrol (E85) used in ﬂex-fuel cars only appears from about2035 in the core constrained case (LC), accounting for 26% of total
transport fuel demand in 2050—12 times more than in the
reference case (REF). In the related Lifestyle variant (LS LC), lower
demand and greater preference for efﬁcient vehicles means that
biodiesel hybrids are preferred (see also Fig. 4).
Hydrogen also only plays a major role in the constrained cases
(LC & LS LC) in the long term (2050), which sees three quarter of
the truck ﬂeet switching from diesel/biodiesel ICE to hydrogen
J. Anable et al. / Energy Policy 41 (2012) 125–138 135fuel cell powertrains. There is a minor role for hydrogen fuel cell
trains from 2030 in the unconstrained cases, where hydrogen
powers a third of rail energy demand by 2050.6. Implications for carbon emissions and the wider energy
system
Overall, the unconstrained Lifestyle variant (LS REF) resulted in
a 26% and 58% reduction in transport CO2 emissions at source (or
direct, tailpipe) by 2020 and 2050 compared to the core reference
scenario (REF) levels (Fig. 6). Importantly, the reduction in these
emissions happens early on and mostly before 2030, after which
transport CO2 emissions stabilise. CO2 emissions at source notably
exclude upstream emissions from power generation, which for
the whole economy are also 7% and 17% lower by 2020 and 2050
than baseline (REF) levels. This suggests that the higher uptake,
use and associated electricity demand of ‘plugged-in’ vehicles is
more than offset by the decreasing demand for (car) travel overall.
As for the carbon constrained scenarios, the results shown in
Fig. 6 suggest that in the core constrained reference case (LC) the
transport sector only starts to pull its weight from around 2030,
mainly as a result of the widespread use of second generation bio-
fuels. The gradually tightening decarbonisation targets prior to
2030 are met by other sectors. In contrast, the constrained
Lifestyle case (LS LC) follows the same carbon emissions trajectory
as the unconstrained Lifestyle case (LS REF) up to about 2040,
after which transport CO2 fall sharply to levels that are even 37%
lower than in the core carbon constrained (LC) scenario.
Across the whole economy in 2050, carbon emissions are 30%
lower in the unconstrained Lifestyle case (LS REF) compared to
REF. As can also be seen by the late divergence of the LS REF and
the LS LC lines in Fig. 6, this in turn makes the achievement of
radical carbon reductions such as the 80% easier, with fewer
changes required to the transport or energy systems. Indeed, total
energy demand between the two Lifestyle variants is comparable
(between 3800 and 4400 PJ), it is mainly the virtual elimination of
diesel in favour of biodiesel that takes place in order to meet the
carbon constraint, although the use of bio-fuels is still only half
that taken up in the core constrained (LC) scenario. In addition,
the Lifestyle constrained case (LS LC) requires around 25% less
electricity than the LC scenario, thus requiring a lower rate ofFig. 6. Projections of CO2 emissions (Mt) at source from domestic transport in each scen
exclude emissions from power generation.growth in the construction of large scale centralised zero carbon
electricity technologies such as carbon capture and storage,
nuclear and wind capacity.
This has important implications for climate mitigation policy.
A scenario that involves voluntary lifestyle change will place
much less pressure on policy to require rapid (and potentially
disruptive) technical change, including technologies at the point
of energy use. The assumption that encouraging lifestyle change
presents more problematic issues for policy makers than a ‘top
down’ technical solution is therefore challenged by these ﬁndings.
The most signiﬁcant impact of lifestyle change on the wider
energy system, compared to the core scenarios, is due to
reductions in the overall demand for ﬁnal energy, particularly
for oil derived fuels in transport. When changes in both the
residential and the transport sectors are added, total ﬁnal energy
demand is 15% lower than the REF scenario by 2020 and 30% by
2050, with beneﬁcial effects for energy system costs, carbon
emissions and energy import requirements. Lifestyle change alone
(without a carbon constraint) has an effect on total ﬁnal energy
demand akin to an 80% carbon constraint with no lifestyle change.
The effects are most strong for the fuels where import depen-
dence is most likely. In the unconstrained Lifestyle case (LS REF),
by 2050, gas use is 34% lower and oil use 54% lower than in REF.
The implications for energy security are therefore very substan-
tial. This compares interestingly to ﬁndings reported elsewhere
that explicit concerns about energy security would lead to greater
attention to reducing demand (Skea and Ekins, 2009), i.e. the
same correlation but with opposite causality. The implications of
concerns about a combination of climate change and energy
security merit further research.7. Summary of results
Modelling of radical changes in lifestyle led to a 74% reduction
in distance travelled by car by 2050. The use of all other surface
transport modes increases, apart from a 12% fall in distance
travelled by trucks. The reduction in car travel comes about as a
result of signiﬁcant mode shifts, particularly to bus travel towards
the latter half of the period (184% increase in vehicle kilometres)
and cycling and walking. The take-up of cycling as a mode of
transport reaches the same level in terms of mode split by 2050 asario, MED results. Note: These are source (or direct, or tailpipe) emissions and thus
Table 3
Summary results of the Lifestyle variant (LS REF).
2007 2020 2050
Average distance travelled (km per person p.a.) 11,484 10,756 9035
Avg. car occupancy 1.58 1.75 1.94
Mode split (% distance)
Cars and motorcycles 83% 71% 40%
Slow modes 3% 9% 28%
Bus and rail 14% 20% 32%
Share of new ‘large cars’ 15% 0% 0%
On-road fuel efﬁciency: km affected km affected km affected
Cars, 8% better per km 4% 46% 62%
Vans, 8% better per km 4% 50% 70%
Trucks, 4% better per km 4% 50% 70%
Air demand growth (p.a.) 2.5% 1.0% 0.0%
Technology choice, e.g. share of new cars by propulsion 99% ICE 16% EV 9% EV
28% HEV 18% HEV
8% PHEV 46% PHEV
Transport CO2 at source, reduction over baseline (REF) n/a 26% 58%
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mode shift is combined with destination shifting as trips are
either totally abstracted from the system through virtual travel or
shorter as a result of localisation.
UK road vehicles are getting ‘plugged-in’ as PHEV cars reach
nearly 50% market share of total car ﬂeet by 2050 and 26% of road
transport energy demand is met by PHEV by 2050. An uncon-
strained Lifestyle case (LS REF) implies that 10% of the UK car park
will be able to connect to the grid by 2020 and 36% by 2030. There
is no change compared to the REF scenario in the short term, as
the numbers remain constrained by the lack of vehicle and
infrastructure availability. For road freight, all of the scenarios
imply that nearly half of the UK van and HGV ﬂeets will be able to
connect to the grid by 2030. To achieve the level of production
and sales demanded by the scenarios, market conditions and
necessary infrastructure to support the rollout of grid-connected
vehicles, particularly PHEV, beyond urban areas will need to be in
place. The period after 2020 will need to see an increase in the
range of vehicles available to consumers and freight operators in
order to sustain the growth momentum. In addition, car owners
downsize and drivers respond to the on-road fuel efﬁciency
programme and speed limit enforcement as the car ﬂeet alone
uses 5–6% (2020) and 11–12% (2050) less energy per km driven.
Overall, the LS REF scenario results in a 26% and 58% reduction
in transport CO2 emissions by 2020 and 2050 from the levels in
the unconstrained core reference scenario (REF). The key outputs
are summarised in Table 3.8. Discussion and conclusions
This paper has investigated the role of pro-environmental
lifestyle change for the UK energy system to 2050 by concentrat-
ing on changes in transport activity. It starts with the premise that
society and human behaviour change over time, sometimes in
unpredictable directions, and therefore there is a wide variety of
possible future levels of energy service demand and end use
technology choice. We also assume that energy using behaviours
are the result of the interaction between personal decisions and
the social and economic context including the available technol-
ogies, physical infrastructures and public policy. Our analysis is
therefore socio-technical.
Our analysis contrasts the techno-economic driven approach
to carbon emissions reduction with the results of a novel and
integrated modelling approach which characterised patterns of
travel behaviour consistent with a more sustainable, low energyservice demand society. This necessarily involves ‘what if’
scenario planning, which is not intended to allow the emergence
of a single vision for the future but rather to challenge policy
makers to consider how to formulate policies that can be robust in
the face of such future uncertainty and thus positively contribute
to society’s evolution. In particular, this analysis implies that the
role of policy is not restricted to inﬂuencing pricing and
technological change but also has a role in shaping lifestyles
and energy-using behaviours.
We have used an innovative methodology to combined the
strength of detailed bottom-up modelling and a sectoral model-
ling approach with an optimisation model of the whole UK energy
system. By using a structured ‘storyline’ approach and breaking
down current travel choices into their constituent journey
purposes, lengths and modes, we reﬂected the potential impact
that long term structural changes in society and concurrent
changes in individual priorities and preferences might have on the
volume and composition of travel activity. This incorporated non-
price determinants of behaviour (values, norms, fashion; trust;
knowledge) and non-consumptive factors (time use; mobility;
social networking; policy acceptance). We have assumed changes
to behaviour that we judge reasonable in an advanced economy,
based on observation of energy-using activities across the
developed world today. And we have assumed rates of change
that seem feasible taking into account the need for both
technologies and energy-using practices to diffuse and the
external constraints to this, e.g. the need to change existing
infrastructure.
Our results revealed a different future in which ﬁnal energy
demand in the transport sector would be halved by 2050
compared to the reference case. This implies rates of change
(energy demand decreases) of just below 2% annually. Moreover,
despite the more rapid uptake of plug-in and battery electric
vehicles and the larger share of electricity in ﬁnal energy demand,
the Lifestyle variants of our core scenarios showed a future in
which the need for massive electriﬁcation to meet carbon targets
would be signiﬁcantly reduced. Thus, under a scenario where
energy demand is reduced, electricity sector decarbonisation
could be delayed. Impacts on carbon emissions from transport
sector at source are similar to those on ﬁnal energy, i.e. a 58%
reduction without a carbon constraint, and with more early
progress. We conclude that lifestyle change can make a signiﬁcant
contribution to delivering UK carbon emission goals, and assist
early action, but that alone it is insufﬁcient to deliver an 80%
reduction goal, as this requires a wider transformation of the
energy system.
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preferences and societal norms outlines the key trade-off to be
made between the more aggressive pursuit of energy efﬁciency
and demand reduction (Skea and Ekins, 2009). Given the many
uncertainties and risks involved in decarbonising our energy
supply, there are strong arguments for pursuing both demand and
supply side solutions in order to make the path to an 80%
reduction more sustainable and potentially more certain.
Yet current market and regulatory arrangements sit uneasily
with the requirement to tackle behaviour change let alone the
transformational change required. Even though the role of
behaviour change in carbon emissions reduction is already
established in policy analysis, the dominance of techno-economic
analysis leads to a favouring of carbon pricing and technical
solutions. Analyses based in these disciplines therefore some-
times give the impression (and in some cases even assumes
explicitly) that ‘policy cannot change behaviour’. However,
there is no substance, theoretically or empirically, for such an
assumption.
The policy agenda for lifestyle change is less well developed
than the equivalents for pricing and technological change. But the
broad principles of what works are increasingly well-understood.
For instance, studies of individual travel behaviour demonstrate
that behaviour is constantly changing in both sustainable and
unsustainable directions (Goodwin, 1999). These changes are not
equal and result in a net change in aggregate travel behaviour
which, so far, has led to unsustainable patterns. It is important
therefore to recognise the existence of churns in travel behaviour
and to attempt to develop appropriate policies to target different
groups of travellers with the relevant transport policies in order to
improve the transport system. Other evidence points to the
potential malleability of travel behaviour. For instance, Cairns
et al. (1998) examined over 70 case studies in 11 different studies
where road space had been reallocated due to sudden shocks (e.g.
earthquakes) or planned (e.g. pedestrianisation schemes) and
found across all case studies, the average trafﬁc reduction in the
total local network soon after the change was 22%, with a median
of 11%. Similarly, we know that the trafﬁc reduction after the
London congestion charge was in the order of 15% immediately
after its introduction (TfL, 2007), car trafﬁc reduced by 39% on
motorways overnight after the ‘fuel protests’ in the UK in 2000
(Hathaway, 2004), and cycling increased dramatically after the
terrorist attacks in London in 2005 (although the trend was
already upward).
However, despite mounting evidence of the key role that
behaviour change can play in decarbonising the transport sector
(see Anable, 2005; Hickman and Banister, 2007; Cairns et al.,
2008; Koehler, 2009), UK policy gives far less attention to
demand-side measures to reduce total kilometres travelled or,
shift to less carbon intensive modes of transport. But, if we cannot
deﬁne sustainable lifestyles and incorporate non-price driven
behavioural motivations into our analytical frameworks, it will
continue to be hard to assess the effectiveness of policy measures
taken to move towards them and the reluctance to adopt them
will continue. This paper goes some way to fulﬁlling this role. It is
however, acknowledged, that a scenario that relies on such
fundamental shifts in activity patterns, preferences and price
signals will have far reaching implications on many other aspects
of society and economy such as wider consumption practices (e.g.
leisure, food consumption and work practices), preferences for
business and residential location and knock-on land values.
Therefore, in addition to understanding the behavioural and
public policy processes to bring about lifestyle shifts, there is
much more that needs to be done to understand the system-wide
energy implications of fundamental socio-technical transitions in
transport as well as other sectors.Acknowledgements
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